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Abstract
The central thesis of this paper is that while the 1980s
proved to be a decade of substantial change in U.S. human resource
management practices, the process of change is not yet complete. In
the past decade human resource management issues featured
prominently in national debates over competitiveness and human
resource professionals were expected to ascend to positions of
greater influence in corporate strategy making and implementation.
Yet, while important innovations in practice were implemented in
many American firms and these changes were accompanied by numerous
calls for a paradigm shift toward a more "strategic" focus for
human resource management research, developments in both practice
and research fell far short of expectations. Thus, the process of
transforming human resource policy into a strategic asset for
employees, individual firms, or the American economy is not yet
complete.
This paper will argue that a more powerful transformational
process will be required if human resource policies and practices
are to fulfill these expectations. In turn, researchers will need
a more powerful model for interpreting this transformational
process--one which embeds innovations in human resource practices
in a deeper theory of organizational governance and stakeholder
influence. We will suggest that the "strategic" human resource
management models of the 1980s were too limited and reactive in
character because they depended so heavily on the values,
strategies, and support of top executives and line managers. While
we see the values and support of top executives as necessary
conditions, we do not see them as sufficient to support the
transformational process. A model capable of achieving sustained
and transformational change will, therefore, need to incorporate
more active roles of other stakeholders in the employment
relationship, including government, employees, and union
representatives as well as line managers and top executives.
The paper starts by reviewing the evidence on innovations in
human resource management in the past decade and then outlines the
implications of the change model we have in mind for human resource
management and industrial relations theory, policy, and practice.
Special emphasis is given to the role of human resource
professionals as potential change agents or facilitators of the
transformational process.
HUMAN RESOURCES AND NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
Can the United States maintain its traditional position of
economic leadership and one of the world's highest standards of
living in the face of increasing global competition? Concerned
observers cite the following negative news: lagging rates of
productivity growth, non-competitive product quality in key
industries, structural inflexibilities, and declining real wage
levels and flat family earnings (Carnavale, 1991). Further, they
offer a plethora of proposed solutions covering both broad public
policies and more specific firm-level policies and practices.
The latter often call upon organizations to do a better job of
developing and utilizing their human resources (Cyert and Mowery,
1986; Marshall, 1987; Walton, 1987; Dertouzos, Solow, and Lester,
1989). Newly industrializing economies such as Mexico, Brazil, and
some of the Asian countries compete in world markets with wages
that range from 10 to 30 percent of those paid in more advanced
countries such as Japan, Germany, and the U.S. For companies in
the more advanced countries to compete in world markets without
lowering wages and living standards requires not only ever-
increasing levels of productivity, but also finding other sources
of competitive advantage such as high product quality, product
differentiation, innovation, and speed to market.
But, competing on these grounds often requires major
organizational transformations in human resource policies and
practices. This is especially the case for U.S. firms that have
grown up under the legacy of scientific management and industrial
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engineering principles that emphasize the separation of decision-
making from doing and narrow divisions of labor and functional
specialization. It is also true for unionized firms that have long
done business under the New Deal model of labor relations that
emphasizes job control unionism and the separation of managerial
prerogatives from worker and union rights.
The past decade has witnessed an explosion of interest in
human resource management and the growth of a number of new
academic journals, professional societies, and industry-university
research and educational partnerships. All of these share the view
that human resource issues should and, given the increased
awareness of their importance, would be elevated to new levels of
influence within corporate decision-making and national policy
making. In the U.S. these expectations and arguments have been
voiced before, in some cases way before (Slichter, 1919; Douglas,
1919). Nonetheless, even today we find that the human resource
function within many American corporations remains weak and
relatively low in influence relative to other managerial functions
such as finance, marketing, and manufacturing (Kochan and Osterman,
1991). Moreover, despite the outpouring of academic writing on
"strategic human resource management" little progress has been made
in developing systematic theory or empirical evidence on the
conditions under which human resources are elevated to a position
where the firm sees and treats these issues as a source of
competitive advantage. Nor is there much research that actually
tests the effects of different strategies on the competitive
position of the firm.
Countless national competitiveness commissions and at least
three national commissions sponsored by current or former
Secretaries of Labor have documented the need for the country, as
well as individual firms, to invest more in human resources and
encourage the development of workplace innovations to fully utilize
employee talents once developed. But, so far these clarion calls
have often fallen on either deaf or hostile ears. Corporate
managements, for reasons we will document below, have not proven
particularly enthusiastic. Responses from labor leaders have been
mixed. Many of the recommended practices have been pioneered in
non-union firms and some union leaders see them as inherently anti-
union in nature. Yet the economic pressures of the 1980s led to a
certain amount of joint union-management experimentation and these
experiences have produced a cadre of local and, to a lesser extent,
national union leaders who are advocates. As yet, however, no
clear vision or strategy on these issues has been articulated by
the labor movement. And, finally, there has been virtually no
action on the part of national policy makers to create either the
environment or the substantive policies needed to encourage or
require either firms or unions to act more forcefully in this
regard.
Why does the rhetoric so far outstrip the reality? One
(although certainly not the only) answer is that theorists and
researchers have cast their models of human resource management and
related policy issues too narrowly. Specifically, they have relied
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too heavily on top management and human resource managers within
corporations to drive the necessary transformation. Too little
consideration has been given to the organizational and
institutional contexts in which firms formulate and implement their
human resource strategies and policies. Moreover, the literature
has tended to treat each firm as an independent actor whereas, as
we argue below, it is now clear that the practices of individual
firms are influenced not only by their own business strategies,
technologies, and structures, but also by the practices of other
firms in their product and labor markets, as well as by the
activities of their suppliers and customers, of labor unions, and
of public policy-makers (Dyer and Holder, 1988). Thus, we see the
need to bring labor and government back into our theories and
models of human resource management policy and practice. To do
this we need to integrate recent works from human resource
management with research from industrial relations, political
economy, and internal labor markets. We now turn to this task.
GENERIC PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL COMMITMENT FIRMS
Many terms have been used to describe firms that seek to treat
human resources as a source of competitive advantage and to do so
in a manner that preserves high standards of living: "high
commitment" (Walton, 1985), "excellent" (Peters and Waterman,
1982), "best practice" (Dertouzos, et al, 1988), "transformed"
(Kochan, Katz, and McKersie, 1986), and "high commitment" (Lawler,
1986). We will use the term "mutual commitment" (Walton, 1985).
We prefer this term since, as will be evident below, we believe
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that achieving and sustaining this approach requires the strong
support of multiple stakeholders in an organization and in the
broader economy and society in which the organization is embedded.
Figure 1 summarizes a set of generic principles that
characterize the "mutual commitment" approach. It is important to
realize that these are broad principles which are operationalized
in quite different forms across countries and firms. Therefore,
they do not translate into a universal set of "best practices", but
rather stand as broad guidelines to be implemented in ways that
conform to particular cultural or organizational realities.
Further, much work remains to be done to (1) test the validity of
these principles, (2) describe and analyze the different practices
used to meet these principles, and (3) assess the
interrelationships among the principles, practices, and important
societal, organizational, and individual outcomes in different
settings.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 organizes the principles according to the three
tiered institutional framework presented in Kochan, et al, (1986).
At the highest level of the firm, first, it is essential that
business strategies not be built around low costs, and especially
not around low wages, salaries, and benefit levels, but rather
around such sources of competitive advantage as affordable quality,
innovation, flexibility, speed, and customer service (Carnavale,
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1991). Second, key decision-makers must be guided by a set of
values and traditions -- often referred to as organizational
culture -- that views employees as valued stakeholders in the
organization, not as mere cogs in the machine. Within any given
business strategy and strategic context, top managers have
significant discretion in human resource matters and values and
traditions often dictate how, and how wisely, this discretion is
used. Finally, at the strategy and policy-making level it is
necessary that there be one or more mechanisms for giving voice to
employee and human resource interests in strategy formulation and
organizational governance processes. One possibility is the use of
planning mechanisms to assure that human resource issues receive
just due in the formulation of business strategies (Dyer, 1983;
Schuler and Jackson, 1987). In other contexts informal labor-
management information sharing and consultation might be used. In
still others it might be more formal forms of worker representation
in corporate governance structures (e.g., labor leaders on the
board of directors, works councils).
Moving down to the human resource policy level we suggest
three additional principles that are important for achieving
comparative advantage from human resources. First, staffing
policies must be designed and managed in such a way that they
reinforce the principle of employment security and thus promote the
commitment, flexibility, and loyalty of employees. This does not
imply guarantees of lifetime employment, but it does imply that the
first instinct in good times and bad be to build and protect the
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firm's investment in human resources rather than to
indiscriminately add and cut people as knee-jerk responses to
short-term fluctuations in business conditions (Dyer, Foltman, and
Milkovich, 1985). Closely related is the matter of training and
development. Clearly, firms that seek competitive advantage
through human resources must make the necessary investments to
insure that its workforce has the appropriate skills and training
not only to meet short-term job requirements, but, also to
anticipate changing job requirements over time. That is, they --
and their employees -- must be prepared to adopt the concept of
lifelong learning.
The third critical principle at the human resource policy
level concerns compensation. Basic compensation levels must be
adequate to attract and retain a committed, cooperative, and
involved workforce and the compensation structure must be seen as
internally equitable by employees at various levels in different
functions. Over and above competitive basic compensation levels
and structures would be variable, or contingent, compensations
schemes (e.g., bonus plans) designed to reinforce desired forms of
quality, flexibility, and the like, as well as to provide the firm
a means of controlling labor costs in tough times without reverting
to layoffs.
Finally, we move to the level of day-to-day interactions of
employees with their environment, supervision, and jobs. Here we
see several principles as critical. Clearly, in selection high
standards must be set regarding the level of skill, training, and
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educational preparation required of new recruits. The ability to
learn and the willingness to continue to learn over the course of
one's career becomes an extremely important personal attribute for
employees in mutual commitment firms. Second, the education and
skills preparation of employees must be fully utilized on the job.
This requires job and career structures that eschew narrow,
Tayloristic job assignments in favor of flexible work organization
that features expanded jobs and the free-flowing movement of
employees across tasks and functional boundaries.
A third principle operant at the work place level deals with
opportunities for employees and/or their representatives to engage
in problem solving and decision-making in matters which involve
their jobs and the conditions surrounding their jobs, what Lawler
(1988) refers to as job involvement. The fourth and final
workplace principle relates to the quality of relationships between
employees, their representatives, and managers. A high
conflict/low trust relationship (Fox, 1974) is seen as incompatible
with the task of building and maintaining mutual commitment. This
does not mean that all conflicts between employees and employers
wither away. Indeed we continue to assume that conflicting
interests are a natural part of the employment relationship, but
that these conflicts cannot be so all-encompassing that they push
out the potential for effective problem solving and negotiations.
Instead they must be resolved efficiently and in a fashion that
maintains the parties' commitment and capacities for pursuing joint
gains.
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Obviously the above set of principles constitute a caricature
of actual organizations. No organization is expected to meet all
of these principles perfectly or through the same set of practices.
Nonetheless, in the broadest sense it is postulated that when these
principles are properly operationalized they will come together in
the form an integrated system that, other things equal, will
produce globally competitive business results as well as globally
competitive standards of living for employees.
The preceding principles were presented as if each firm has
total discretion over the choice of its human resource strategies
and as if each firm's choice is independent of the strategies
followed by other firms. But, neither of these is accurate.
External factors, particularly the role of the trade unions, the
state (government policy) and, in some countries, industry
associations all influence and/or constrain the range of choices
open to decision-makers. Moreover, individual firms are heavily
influenced by the strategies followed by others in their product
and labor markets, supplier and customer networks, and industries.
Thus, a critical factor is the rate and depth at which the concepts
underlying these principles are diffused across different
institutions and institutional decision-makers, as well as across
various firms and industries.
EXTENT OF DIFFUSION OF MUTUAL COMMITMENT PRINCIPLES
Unfortunately no single data base currently exists that allows
us to estimate precisely how widespread the principles reviewed
above are in U.S. organizations today. It is probably fair to say
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that very few organizations have yet embraced the full set of
principles in a coherent fashion. But, clearly, the past decade
has been a time of great experimentation with various of these
principles to the point that it is probably fair to say that most
large and perhaps even a majority of relatively small firms have
experimented with one or more of them at one time or another.
SUPPORTIVE COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES.
We believe that one of the most powerful determinants and
reinforcing forces for a mutual commitment human resources strategy
lies in the nature of competitive business strategies. Clearly,
many U.S. firms recognize this as well. In some ways, however,
large U.S. firms suffer from the legacies of their prior successes
in taking advantage of the vast size of the U.S. markets. For this
reason, they have experienced more difficulty adapting to export
markets and the flexible production and differentiated competitive
strategies needed to support mutual commitment human resource
strategies (Carnavale, 1991; Piore and Sabel, 1984).
In the clothing industry, for example, despite the obvious
difficulty of competing with imports from low wage countries,
American manufacturers and unions have made only limited progress
in abandoning their traditional individual piece-work and related
mass production strategies in favor of practices that would give
them advantages in time to market and quick response to changing
customer preferences (National Clothing Industry Labor Management
Committee, 1991). As a result imports are taking a greater share
of the market both at the low price points where mass production
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continues to dominate and at the high price points where styling,
fashion, and variability in tastes matter most.
In the U.S. airline industry, the low cost strategies of
Continental and Eastern Airlines served to limit the success of the
high growth and service differentiation strategies of firms such as
American and Delta Airlines in the first decade following industry
deregulation (Kochan and McKersie, 1991). Thus, while low cost
strategies are difficult to sustain over the long run, especially
when faced with competition from abroad, a significant number of
American firms continue to give priority to this strategy and
thereby slow the pace of innovations in human resource practices.
MANAGERIAL VALUES AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE.
As noted earlier, we continue to see top executive and line
management support as a necessary condition for introducing and
sustaining the types of human resource strategies described in
Figure 1. Yet, there is little in the history of American
management, or in the behavior of American management in the 1980s,
to suggest that management alone, left to its own devices, will
produce the transformations in organizational practices needed to
sustain and diffuse the delineated human resource principles.
While some, perhaps even many, top executives share supportive
values, they are buffeted by equally strong countervailing
pressures that call for quick action taken to bolster the short
term interests of major shareholders.
Consider, for example, the following description of the
dominant managerial strategies of the 1980s offered by the top
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human resource executive at General Electric, one of the firms
often cited as symbolizing exemplary management practices (Doyle,
1989):
Economic power in the Eighties--the power to launch and
sustain the dynamic processes of restructuring and
globalization--has been concentrated especially in the hands
of the larger companies, along with the financiers and raiders
who alternatively support or attack them. If the Eighties was
a new Age of the Entrepreneur--and small business did in fact
account for most of the new job creation in the United States-
-it was Corporate America that accounted for most of the
economic disruption and competitive improvement; it took out
people, layers and costs while rearranging portfolios and
switching industries...Across the decade in the U.S. alone,
there was over a trillion dollars of merger and acquisition
and LBO activity. Ten million manufacturing jobs were
eliminated or shifted to the growing service sector. Deals
were cut and alliances forged around America and around the
world.
From where the shots were called was well-known.
Restructuring and globalization did not emerge from employee
suggestion boxes; they erupted from executive suites...
So competitive rigor--imposed by companies in their employer
roles and demonstrated by their restructuring and globalizing
moves--was widely accepted because its rationale was widely
understood. Given this climate--along with a political
environment of relative deregulation--companies in the
Eighties could focus more on portfolios than on people; fire
more than hire; invest more in machines than in skills.
The obvious reality of tough competitive facts inspired fear
in employees and gave employers the power to act. Shuttered
factories and fired neighbors is restructuring without
subtlety: People could see the damage and feel the pain.
This, then, is the perhaps the dominant political environment
of corporate decision-making and governance that must be taken into
account in building theoretical and action models in the human
resource management arena.
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HUMAN RESOURCES IN BUSINESS STRATEGY FORMULATION.
Clearly, very few if any inroads have been made into top-level
business strategy formulation by either informal or formal forms of
employee representation; the European experience remains
distinctively European (Kochan, et al, 1986). Some progress has
been made in bringing human resource considerations into business
strategy sessions through the integration of formal planning
processes. Exactly how much progress, however, is difficult to
say. Recent surveys suggest that at least some level of
integration has been achieved by between 20 and 45 percent of
medium-sized and large firms (Burack, 1986; Nkomo, 1986). More
intensive case studies support these figures, but call into
question the depth of the integration in many cases (Buller, 1988;
Craft, 1988). Functionally, some progressive human resource
departments are striving to adopt a so-called business partner
role, which puts them in a position to interject human resource
considerations in ongoing business decision-making (Dyer and
Holder, 1988). But, again, while the trend is in the right
direction, at this juncture the development is probably neither
very widespread nor particularly deep.
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY.
Diffusion of the practices needed to demonstrate a commitment
to employment continuity is particularly limited in the U.S. (Dyer,
et al, 1985). Massive layoffs became commonplace during the 1980s,
affecting not only blue-collar and clerical employees, but also
traditionally immune professional and managerial employees as well.
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During this time, even firms that had garnered reputations over the
years for eschewing layoffs -- Eastman Kodak and Digital Equipment
Corporation, for example -- gave up the practice (Foulkes and
Whitman, 1985). Many of these firms strove to handle their
employment reductions in ways that smoothed the effects on both
affected employees and survivors -- by providing severance pay and
outplacement services, for example. In general, however, employee
cutbacks have been so severe and handled so badly that there
appears to be widespread agreement among employers and employees
that there has to be a better way. Whether these attitudes
eventually translate into a more systematic management of staffing
levels and processes, however, remains to be seen.
TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT.
U.S. firms spend huge sums on training development (some
estimates put the number at $30 - 40 billion per year). Still, in
per capita terms the amount spent pales in comparison with the
amounts spent by the U.S.'s most formidable international
competitors (Kochan and Osterman, 1991). MacDuffie and Kochan
(1991), for example, found that U.S. automakers do less training
than their Japanese and European counterparts, in part because U.S.
work systems demand fewer skills and in part because the U.S. lacks
national policies and infrastructures that support or require such
firm-level investments.
COMPENSATION.
Current rhetoric clearly supports the use of variable, or
contingent, compensation schemes at all levels of employment (such
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practices are already reasonably widespread among executives and
upper-level managers). Arguments supporting these schemes,
however, are as often couched in labor cost terms as in
motivational terms which, of course, exposes employees, even
relatively low-paid ones, to a downside risk on their earnings, a
perspective that is hardly consistent with the philosophy of mutual
commitment. At any rate, variable, or contingent, compensation is
still another area where rhetoric seems to have outstripped reality
by a fairly wide margin. Surveys show that such pay plans,
including profit-sharing, gain-sharing, and group incentives, tend
to be in effect in no more than one-fifth of medium-sized and large
firms (Conference Board, 1990; O'Dell, 1987). Further, many of
these plans are experimental, having been instituted only within
the last five years, and they often affect only a relatively small
numbers of employees.
SELECTION STANDARDS AND FLEXIBLE WORK ORGANIZATIONS.
Some argue that selection standards in U.S. firms are rising
in response to technological and work design trends that are
upskilling jobs. Others argue (or complain bitterly) that they are
lowering in response to shortages of qualified employees. In fact,
there probably is some of both going on. Certainly, the
desirability of moving to more flexible, and hence more demanding,
forms of work organization is a shibboleth among many management
writers in the U.S. In practice, however, the legacy of Taylorism
and job control unionism (narrow job classifications, tightly
circumscribed seniority and wage rules, and carefully guarded
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managerial and supervisory prerogatives) serves as a severe
constraint on diffusion. Not surprisingly, the most highly visible
and widespread use of work teams and other flexible forms of work
organization has been found in new or "greenfield" plants that are
relatively free from these historical traditions (Walton, 1980).
In existing settings, some corporations have used the incentive of
capital investments in new products or technology, and thus in job
retention, to encourage (or require) local plant managers and,
where present, union leaders, to reform their work systems.
Chrysler, for example, took this approach in negotiating "Modern
Operating Agreements" (MOAs) in six of its facilities in the latter
1980s (Lovell, et al, 1991). Yet, even the Chrysler experience
repeats that which Walton (1985) and others have well documented,
namely that such experiments seem to have some staying power, but
that they generally fail to spread to other units within the firm.
As such they become experimental islands in a sea of traditional
practices. Interestingly, the use of flexible work systems seems
to be gaining faster acceptance among plant managers, local union
leaders, and employees than among higher-level managers and
national union leaders whose support will clearly be required for
diffusion to take hold.
To cite one example, Digital Equipment Corporation recently
announced that it planned to close the two plants in its
organization that had, by its own account, gone further than any
others in committing to and implementing flexible, team based work
systems. One of these was a greenfield site specifically designed
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as an experimental plant from which others were expected to learn
and the other was an existing facility that invested heavily in the
changeover and which won a number of awards from Digital management
for its "manufacturing excellence". Both fell victim to top
management decisions to move production to other facilities in a
corporate downsizing move. We dwell on this case not to single out
Digital, since in many ways this company has gone further than most
others down the path of mutual commitment (Kochan, Osterman, and
MacDuffie, 1986). Rather, we use the case simply to illustrate the
dependence of many workplace innovations on higher-level corporate
decision-making. Ultimately, those within the management structure
advocating manufacturing innovations lost the political debate to
finance specialists who could demonstrate the logistical savings
that would accrue from moving the products produced in these
facilities to other locations.
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION.
There has probably been more experimentation with employee
participation, or involvement, in workplace problem-solving and
decision-making than with any other of the mutual commitment
principles. A surveys conducted in the mid 1980s showed that more
than half of firms with 1,000 or more employees had implemented
some version of quality circles or other employee participation
programs (Alper, Pfau, and Sirota, 1985). More recent, although
less well documented, reports suggest that the pace of
experimentation may have quickened since that time. Even friendly
observers, however, have noted that many of these participatory
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efforts encounter the same sorts of difficulties as do workplace
innovations (with which they are, in fact, often linked) thus
making them difficult to sustain let alone diffuse (Lawler and
Mohrman, 1985; Drago, 1988).
LOW CONFLICT, HIGH TRUST ENVIRONMENT.
Measures of conflict in the workplace are difficult, if not
impossible, to come by. But, surveys of employee attitudes,
including trust levels, are commonplace. While isolated companies
continue privately to report stable (or in some cases even
improving) employee attitudes, the overall pattern suggest a
general erosion among virtually all employee groups. The decline
is particularly sharp in measures of employee trust in management
and in their companies generally (Fisher, 1991; Gordon, 1990; Hay
Group, 1991; Kanter and Mirvis, 1989). Here there is diffusion;
alas, the direction is directly counter to the principles of mutual
commitment.
AN ALTERNATIVE CHANGE MODEL AND SOME PROPOSITIONS
Formal models of organizational change are not well developed
with respect to human resource management issues. Implicit in the
U.S. literature on strategic human resource management, however,
are two general propositions. First, that human resource policies
and practices need to be matched to firms' competitive business
strategies. And second, that change occurs when top executives
and/or key line managers take sufficient interest in human resource
issues to give them, and their professional human resource staffs,
positions of high priority. These propositions reflect a
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fundamental weakness of human resource management theories: a
myopic viewpoint which fails to look beyond the boundary of the
individual firm.
Some years ago we (Kochan and Dyer, 1976) noted the
limitations of this view when applied to joint efforts to introduce
and manage change in union-management relations. At that time we
argued for a change model that recognized the diversity of
stakeholder interests and the role of structural bases of power
that affect such change efforts. In a similar vein, Kochan and
Cappelli (1984), Jacoby (1985), and Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings
(1986) have emphasized the importance of external forces--union
growth, government policy interventions, tight labor markets and/or
crises such as World Wars I and II -- as predictors of innovation
in human resource management practice.
Others have emphasized the importance of the politics of
corporate decision-making (Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991; Thomas,
forthcoming). Support for investment in or consideration of human
resource policies is generally sought within broader contests for
financial and other resources. The outcomes of these political
contests depend heavily on the extent to which advocates can couch
their arguments in the prevailing rationales or decision routines
used in capital budgeting (e.g. payback periods, rates of return,
cost savings, and headcount reductions). This political view can
be extended to incorporate broader issues of corporate governance.
Doyle's previously quoted description of the U.S. approach to
corporate restructuring notes that the speed of adjustment is often
20
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a function of the relative power and pressures exerted by
shareholders or of takeover threats. In this view, support for
human resource initiatives involves a contest not only among
functional units within the firm (e.g., human resources and
finance), but also among the interests of employees, shareholders,
and other stakeholders.
Purcell (1989) has noted that the trend toward divisional or
profit center ("M-Form") organizational structures also serves as
a constraint on the elevation of human resources to levels of
strategic importance. In these structures human resource decisions
tend to be decentralized to the divisional level. This reduces the
likely effects of overall corporate value systems and policies, and
increases the probability that decision horizons will be short-
term.
Two recent international studies reinforce the importance of
developing models that extend beyond the boundaries of individual
firms. Both Walton (1987) and Cole (1989) stress the importance of
national and industry level infrastructures for supporting the
diffusion of innovations in human resource practices across
national economies. And both cite the lack of such infrastructures
as a reason why the U.S. lags in this respect.
Thus, a stronger model of change that considers internal
political and external institutional and policy variables is
required if we are to understand and effectively promote the
diffusion of human resource innovations across the American
economy. While we do not pretend to have a well developed and
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tested model in hand at this point, we offer the following as key
propositions for testing in the interest of developing such a
model:
Proposition 1. The capacity of any individual firm to
initiate and sustain human resource innovations is constrained
by the extent to which these innovations are similarly adapted
by other firms in its product and labor markets and customer
and supplier networks.
The nub of this proposition is that no firm can transform its
human resource practices alone. Human resource innovations are
likely to suffer from what is called a "market failures" problem
(Levine and Tyson, 1990). That is, while all firms and the macro
economy would be better off if all firms invested in human resource
innovations, any particular firm will fail to capture the benefits
of such investments if others fail to follow suit. This is most
clearly seen in the area of investments in training. Leading firms
such as Motorola, IBM, Ford, and General Motors that invest a great
deal in training and development run the risk of losing these
investments to turnover because their employees can attract a wage
premium from firms that prefer to skim the labor market. This, in
turn, reduces their incentives to invest below the level that would
prevail if all firms were developing their own internal labor
markets.
The importance of suppliers and customers participating in
human resource innovations can clearly be seen in the context of
total quality management efforts. Final assemblers can realize the
full payoff of such efforts only if their suppliers meet
corresponding quality standards. Thus, it is not surprising that
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such companies, and particularly Japanese plants operating in the
U.S., have demanded that their suppliers develop parallel quality
improvement programs in order to become or remain a preferred
supplier. Obviously, the reverse logic applies to customers. In
one study of auto suppliers, for example, Gillett (1992) found that
the extent of innovations in internal management systems varied
directly with the expectations of the firms' customers. Change was
quickest in coming and most far reaching among those supplying
Japanese customers who not only demanded them, but also facilitated
their implementation. It was slowest and least extensive among
those supplying divisions of American firms that were themselves
less committed to similar innovations.
While a number of leading firms are now demanding higher
quality from their suppliers, or are being required to provide it
to their customers, so far their reach has been rather limited and
narrowly focused. The general weakness of industry associations in
the U.S., along with the reluctance of firms to intervene in the
human resource and labor-management relations affairs of their
suppliers and customers, suggests that this avenue of change will
have perhaps an important but limited impact. This, however, is a
promising avenue for empirical research. It will be interesting to
see, for example, if the pressures on suppliers, and of customers,
produces a sustained and broad commitment to total quality and
whether this will carry over into areas of human resource
management that face less direct, market-driven, across-firm
pressure.
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Proposition 2. Top and line management commitment is a
desirable, but unlikely and generally insufficient condition
for transforming human resource practices.
Virtually every article written on human resource innovations
contains the obligatory final paragraph asserting the necessity for
top management support for successful implementation. Yet, as
previously noted, these managers are under many competing pressures
from inside and outside the firm, and there is no reason to believe
that employee and human resource considerations will tend to
prevail in their strategic decision-making and day to day actions.
While some chief executives, particularly the founders of such
major companies as Polaroid, IBM, Digital Equipment, and Hewlett
Packard, are well known for values that have long supported human
resource innovations, such is not the case in most U.S. firms where
less visionary CEOs have risen through the ranks of finance,
marketing, manufacturing, or law, with little or no formal exposure
to the human resource function or need to demonstrate human
resource management skills.
U.S. firms tend to promote and transfer managers rapidly,
which also limits the power of managerial values as a driver of
human resource innovations. Such rapid movement provides little
incentive or opportunity for managers to develop the personal trust
and commitment necessary to support such innovations. Under such
circumstances, managers are likely to view investments in human
resources as short term costs that will at best produce payoffs for
their successors. A study of innovations at a number of Chrysler
plants found that the average tenure of a plant manager was under
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two years and each time the manager turned over the process of
change was noticeably slowed (Lovell, et al, 1991).
The vast majority of top American executives believe that
unions are unnecessary and undesirable in their firms (but perhaps
not in the broader society). This value is often translated into
a high priority for union avoidance and/or containment. This, of
course, limits the options for human resource professionals within
such firms since they must be careful to try to achieve desired
innovations without the active involvement of union officials or,
if unorganized, to introduce innovations in ways that avoid
creating the collective equivalent of a union.
In brief, the values of top executives and line managers are
an important source of support that needs to be garnered. But
reliance on a strategy of expecting these values to develop
naturally is likely to continue to create islands of innovation
that do not diffuse or that are not sustained. Thus, legal,
structural, or personal bases of power that elevate the influence
of employee and human resource policy interests will need to
supplement and reinforce the values and commitment of top
executives and line managers.
Proposition 3. Human resource innovations require a
coalitional, multiple stakeholder change model.
If human resource professionals are in a relatively weak
position in managerial hierarchies and their more powerful line
managers and top executives are only sporadic allies in the
innovation process, a broader base of support and power will be
needed to sustain innovations. The lessons of the historical
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models cited above suggest that these broader stakeholders include
government regulatory agencies, employee and/or labor union
representatives, and industry and/or professional associations.
Historically most democratic societies have relied on the pressure
of unions to discipline and motivate management to upgrade human
resource standards and practices. Continued decline in labor
union membership in the U.S. not only weakens this potential source
of pressure, it creates a cycle of mistrust and adversarial
tensions that limits the capacity of union leaders to work
cooperatively with management on innovative programs. Union
leaders instead come to feel threatened and, in turn, define their
primary challenge as a fight for survival and legitimacy. Thus, a
cycle of low trust and high conflict gets perpetuated in a way that
drives out opportunities for jointly sponsored innovative
activities. Reversing this cycle would go a long way toward the
diffusion of the mutual commitment principles noted above.
Similarly,' to subvert the "market failures" effect noted
above, government policy makers will also need to be enlisted as
part of a coalition supporting human resource innovations. This,
in turn, requires a significant shift in the behavior, and perhaps
the mindset, of human resource management professionals who
generally endorse voluntary industry efforts over government
policies that would require or mandate innovative practices. This
commitment to voluntarism is rooted both in an ideological
predisposition to protect the prerogatives and autonomy of
individual firms and a recognition of the enormous diversity of the
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American economy. Yet herein lies a paradox. As long as these
values and considerations dominate the politics of human resource
management professionals, the diffusion, sustainability, and impact
of the very principles they espouse is likely to remain quite
limited.
Proposition 4. Human resource professionals need to be open
to learning from international sources. Transferring
innovations across national borders and organizational
boundaries offers the best opportunities for achieving broad,
non-incremental change in human resource practices.
One important lesson brought home forcefully by Japanese
direct investment in the U.S. is that American managers perhaps
have more to learn about human resource management from foreign
competitors than they have to offer. The U.S. auto industry is
perhaps the most visible example of this. Since the mid 1980s the
most productive and highest quality auto manufacturing plants in
the U.S. have been those that are Japanese owned and managed
(Krafcik, 1988). The New United Motors Manufacturing Inc (NUMMI)
facility jointly owned by General Motors and Toyota, but managed by
the latter, has received the most attention because it achieved
benchmark levels of productivity and quality with an American
workforce and union and with less technological investment than
exists in most American owned and managed plants in the U.S. The
dominant lesson from this case is that there is much value in a
holistic approach to human resource management that is integrated
with the dominant production system and that emphasizes the mutual
commitment principles previously noted (Shimada and MacDuffie,
1986).
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Indeed, the human resource approaches introduced in NUMMI and
other Japanese firms represent fundamental changes that cut across
all three levels of the framework introduced in Figure 1. In some
instances U.S. auto companies are attempting to achieve similar
systemic changes in their facilities and in new organizations such
as G.M.'s Saturn Division. Thus, the visible presence and high
level of performance achieved with a fundamentally different human
resource management system than existed in comparable American
facilities has been an extremely powerful spur to transforming
practices across this industry.
The lessons offered to the U.S. by other countries are not
limited to Japan. Recently, policy makers and academics (and an
increasing number of union leaders) have become interested in the
German apprenticeship and training system, as well as German style
works councils. Because, however, these institutions require
greater government and joint labor-business-government interaction
and consensus, they have received only limited attention and
support to date from the general business community and human
resource managers and professionals.
Proposition 5. Documenting the effects of human resource
polices on economic outcomes of interest to managers and
employees is critical to sustaining support for these
innovations. Learning networks that involve all the diverse
stakeholders with an interest in these innovations can then
speed the transfer, acceptance, and use of this knowledge in
other settings.
NUMMI came to serve as such an important spur to innovation in
the automobile industry because word of its economic performance
levels spread so quickly. More recently, MacDuffie and Krafcik
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(1991) have shown that the positive performance effects of the
NUMMI approach generalizes to other facilities as well. As a
result, the virtues of this approach are becoming even more widely
accepted throughout the world auto industry. Unfortunately, this
is all too rare an example. Few human resource practices or
interrelated systems of practices are evaluated in as systematic
and convincing a fashion as has been the case in the auto industry.
This approach was possible because the industry's major
stakeholders accepted standard performance benchmarks (hours per
car for productivity and number of defects per car and/or number of
customer complaints per car for quality) and then cooperated with
university researchers to collect, analyze, and publish the results
of across-plant and across-firm comparisons (without revealing the
identity of individual plants or firms). This type of learning
network stands as a model of what is needed to accelerate the
process of knowledge generation and innovation diffusion.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In summary, we believe that the type of change model that is
necessary to support diffusion of human resource innovations starts
with a clear model of the generic principles or requirements that
must be met, casts its vision internationally to discover world-
class benchmarks, engages a broad coalition of human resource and
labor advocates within and outside the firm in a network that works
together to promote and diffuse innovations, and then provides the
analytic data required to evaluate and disseminate the economic
effects of the innovations. With the strength of this broad base
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of support and harder evidence for the effects of the innovations,
informed government representatives can then contribute by
providing the national or macro level infrastructure and policies
needed to go from micro-firm specific islands of innovation to
changes of sufficient scope and magnitude to make a difference in
national competitiveness and standards of living. If this is done,
the field of human resource management will have achieved its own
transformation from the traditional image of personnel
administration to a truly strategic orientation and contribution.
If events fail to move in these directions, on the other hand, the
voices of human resource managers and professionals in many firms
are destined to remained buried deep within the managerial
hierarchy pleading for, but only sporadically receiving, the
support and commitment of their more powerful managerial brethren.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
Obviously, this view requires a substantial investment in high
quality research to identify promising human resource innovations
and to evaluate their effects on organizational and individual
outcomes of interest to multiple stakeholders. Presupposed is a
broadened perspective of the relevant stakeholders to include not
only top managers (and maybe stockholders), but also various types
of employees, labor leaders, and purveyors of public policies.
Also presupposed is a multi-national -- or global -- view, as well
as a corresponding willingness to learn from the lessons of other
countries. All this may represent a particularly radical departure
for U.S. scholars.
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Certainly, there is no assumption here that prevailing
sentiments extolling the virtues of various forms of human resource
innovations and the new-found influence of today's human resource
managers represent either reality or inevitability. To achieve
global competitiveness and satisfactory standards of living will
require broadened perspectives of human resource systems, the
development of more realistic models of organizational change, and
a mountain of convincing evidence. Absent these, in the long run
the prevailing rhetoric cannot help but fall on deaf ears.
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Figure 1
Principles Guiding
Mutual Commitment Firms
Strategic Level
Supportive Business Strategies
Top Management Value Commitment
Effective Voice For HR In
Strategy Making And Governance
Functional (Human Resource Policy) Level
Staffing Based On Employment Stabilization
Investment in Training And Development
Contingent Compensation That Reinforces
Cooperation, Participation, And Contribution
Workplace Level
Selection Based On High Standards
Broad Task Design And Teamwork
Employee Involvement In Problem-Solving
Climate Of Cooperation And Trust
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